Abstract rationality in education: from Vygotsky to Brandom by Derry, Jan
 1 
Abstract rationality in education: from Vygotsky to Brandom 
 
Abstract 
Abstract rationality has increasingly been a target of attack in contemporary educational research 
and practice and in its place practical reason and situated thinking have become a focus of interest.  The 
argument here is that something is lost in this. In illustrating how we might think about the issue, this paper 
makes a response to the charge that as a result of his commitment to the ‘enlightenment project’ Vygotsky 
holds abstract rationality as the pinnacle of thought. Against this it is argued that Vygotsky had a far more 
sophisticated appreciation of reason and of its remit. The paper proceeds first by examining the picture of 
Vygotsky that is presented in the work of James Wertsch, and especially his claim that Vygotsky was an 
ambivalent rationalist, goes on to provide an account of Vygotsky that corrects this picture, and develops 
this in the light of the work of Robert Brandom, who shares Vygotsky’s inheritance of Hegel. The 
conclusion towards which this piece points is that the philosophical underpinnings of Vygotsky’s work 
provide a radically different idea of rationality and epistemology from that characterised as abstract 
rationality and that this has significance for education studies.  
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Abstract rationality is a target of attack by contemporary educationalists. This criticism is 
not without reason since there are clear errors involved in an approach to education that 
separates rules, procedures and the development of skills and capacities from the 
Lebenswelt. The force of the critique of anything that goes under the rubric of abstract 
rationality has been motivated by a redirection of focus towards the contextual, the 
situated and the practical and away from any notion of reason understood in universal 
terms presupposing a shared psychic unity of human kind. In contrast to a unifying 
project associated with rationalism, the emphasis is on multiple ways of making meaning 
sustained by variations in cultural experiences and forms of life that are widely viewed as 
incommensurable. In turn the critique of abstract rationality in education has raised 
questions regarding the forms of knowledge appropriate to learners. Areas of curriculum 
that are seen to exemplify abstract rationality have been questioned as regards their 
usefulness for learners.  
 
While criticisms of abstract rationality are not groundless the term abstract rationality has 
been used far too widely and at times has amounted almost to a critique of reason itself, 
where for instance it has been used to apply to any form of reasoning that goes beyond 
context and suggests universal remit. The idea of an abstract decontextualised reason 
based on universal principles is counter-posed to the contingency of context. That there 
might be an intricate relation between the two is not considered in this stark polarisation 
and in place of serious consideration of this possibility, the failure of the enlightenment 
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project is taken as given and replaced by a meaning-making always confined to the 
specific contexts.  
 
Vygotsky has interesting things to say on matters connected with abstract rationality. Yet 
his work has been the subject of criticism on the grounds of his supposed commitment to 
the Enlightenment model of the relation between language and the world that he is seen 
to hold.   
 
                      The aim of this paper is to reject this blanket attack on abstract rationality 
and to show that Vygotsky‘s position is altogether more subtle than his exponents in 
education have tended to suggest. It will do this by, examining in section one, the picture 
of Vygotsky that is presented in the work of James Wertsch, especially his claim that 
Vygotsky was an ambivalent rationalist. Wertsch argues that taken as a whole 
‗Vygotsky‘s writings reflect a kind of ambivalence with regard to where he stood on the 
ideals of Enlightenment rationality.‘ (Wertsch, 1996, p.38). Wertsch sees these ideals as 
potentially negative and for him they represent; the logical, the universal, the timeless 
and the general by contrast with the rhetorical, the particular, the local and the timely. 
Vygotsky, however, had a far more sophisticated appreciation of the nature and scope of 
reason and its significance for education than that found in contemporary 
characterisations of his view of rationality. The paper will go on, therefore, in section 
two, to provide an account of Vygotsky that corrects this picture and explores, in 
particular, aspects of his account of the relations of concepts to the world. In doing so the 
paper is compelled to consider, albeit briefly, the influence that Hegel exercised on 
Vygotsky‘s thinking, because it was under the influence of Hegel in particular that 
Vygotsky developed his ideas about rationality. In section three these lines of thought are 
taken further in the light of the work of Robert Brandom, who shares Vygotsky‘s 
inheritance of Hegel. My discussion of Hegel‘s presence in Brandom‘s work serves also 
to show the way that after having been ignored or even been disparaged by Anglo-
American philosophers Hegel‘s work is now being recognised in leading circles in 
contemporary philosophy (Brandom, 2000, McDowell, 1996). What is particularly 
interesting is that Brandom‘s attraction to Hegel, for the importance that he (Hegel) 
attached to the social nature of thinking, is precisely the same as Vygotsky‘s. The 
conclusion towards which this paper points is that the philosophical underpinnings of 
Vygotsky‘s work provide a radically different idea of rationality and epistemology from 
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that characterised as abstract rationality, and that the importance of this for studies in 
education has been badly neglected. 
 
An appropriate point on which to start the argument is a brief account of salient aspects 
of Wertsch‘s reading of Vygotsky. 
 
 
1. James Wertsch’s Vygotsky and the idea of the enlightenment project 
 
Prior to the publication of the Collected Works (1999)
1
 James Wertsch was one of the 
most influential commentators bringing Vygotsky‘s work to a wider audience. In 
common with many researchers in the Vygotskian field Wertsch has a concern for the 
improvement of access, opportunity and learning for those involved in mass schooling. 
His interest in using Vygotsky‘s work to examine ‗the institutional, historical, and 
cultural specificity of mental functioning‘ (Wertsch, 1992, p.112) reflects a general 
movement in recent years away from viewing mental functioning as a unified entity 
unrelated to context. Thus, Wertsch questions abstract reason in terms of what he calls 
‗decontextualised rationality‘; He states:  
 
The defining characteristic of the voice of decontextualised rationality is that it 
represents objects and events …in terms of formal logical and if possible 
quantifiable categories. The categories used in this form of representation are 
decontextualised in the sense that their meaning can be derived from their 
position in abstract theories or systems that exist independently of particular 
speech types.  …the meaning of five or electron …can be and often is 
established by definitions that are abstract (i.e. independent of particular use) 
and hence identical across contexts.   
(Wertsch, 1992, p.120) 
 
He goes on to emphasise that although decontextualised meanings are thought to have 
some kind of primordial existence that underlies our use of language they actually grew 
out of discourses associated with the rise of literacy (Wertsch, 1992, p.120).  The 
treatment of decontextualised meanings within narrow historical coefficients runs the 
risk, given the categorical rejection of any overarching concept of history, of sliding into 
an unhelpful relativism. A further example of this can be found in Wells who emphasises 
that semiotic practices and artefacts have enabled the sociohistorical development of 
scientific rationality to emerge and states: ―The fact that ‗scientific rationality‘ has come 
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to be highly valued in Western cultures does not therefore mean that it is superior, in 
some absolute sense, to other modes of thinking.‖ (Wells, 1996) 
 
For Wertsch and Wells abstract rationality conceived in this way is just one 
historically and socially developed way that meaning is made: it is one of a variety of 
ways by which individuals make sense of their world depending on the practices that they 
participate in. This questioning of the privileged status of abstract rationality has 
contributed to the shift of attention of those concerned with pedagogy to the forms of 
making meaning and to their situated dimension. Alongside this shift and to some extent 
connected with it has been a questioning of the status of what was previously considered 
knowledge and truth. Thus the impact of Constructivism in educational theory with its 
emphasis on the meaning-making of the individual learner, has challenged the relevance 
and significance of any particular system of knowledge.  
 
The concerns that have been expressed about Vygotsky's work are often couched in broad 
terms that take the Enlightenment project to be committed to a conception of the nature 
and power of reason that is now found wanting. This general line of argument is 
rehearsed to different degrees throughout a good deal of what is currently published in 
educational research.  Many educational writings have ignored the tradition of philosophy 
that is not only fundamental to the work of Vygotsky but also provides a different route 
for considering current educational issues (and cannot be captured by the critical 
characterisation of the Enlightenment project). Criticisms of Vygotsky require a proper 
appreciation of the philosophical terrain on which his work developed. 
 
 Wertsch‘s work on Vygotsky is particularly helpful as a counterpoint, because it 
provides a worked out critique of abstract rationality in relation to concrete educational 
concerns. Wertsch has written repeatedly on the difficulties Vygotsky faced due to his 
writing in an enlightenment climate; in fact he claims it is this climate that accounts for 
an ambivalence in Vygotsky‘s work between an approach to meaning with an emphasis 
on locale and culture, on the one hand, and a hard scientific realism and a hierarchical 
form of reason
2
, on the other. 
 
He shares a concern with other commentators on Vygotsky‘s work, that the 
scientific concepts Vygotsky favours reflect the influence of an eighteenth century 
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rationality now undermined by what is understood about the failures of the 
Enlightenment project. However, it is interesting to note that although the Enlightenment 
is often characterised as epitomising an abstract, universalist and logo-centric conception 
of reason, it was historically, among other things, a search for meaning that could no 
longer be found in the secure foundation of a divine absolute.  Seen in this light the 
Enlightenment involved a rejection of authority rather than the positive assertion of it, 
which modern critics perceive. 
In his characterisation of the Enlightenment, Wertsch adopts Toulmin‘s revised 
account of what he terms the ‗received view of modernity‘; this he argues has profound 
implications for understanding Vygotsky‘s writings. (Wertsch, 1996, p. 37) In his book 
Cosmopolis: the hidden agenda of modernity Toulmin (1992) writes of a struggle 
between Enlightenment rationality and Renaissance humanism. Wertsch finds many 
explicit statements in Vygotsky‘s writings that correspond to what Toulmin terms the 
―received view‖; ‗Time and again he shows a strong tendency to value and focus on 
logic, the universal, the general, and the timeless.‘ (Wertsch, 1996, p. 37) The assertion 
(also made by Gordon Wells 1999) that Vygotsky was influenced strongly by the abstract 
rationalist aspect of the Enlightenment due to the time and context in which he worked 
(the Soviet Union in the early part of the last century) ignores the criticism of eighteenth 
century rationality made by Hegel and its influence on Vygotsky. A general point at issue 
here is that the blanket attack on Enlightenment thinking has not only led to a loss of 
valuable elements of this tradition but has also overlooked its developments. Of these the 
development made by Hegel has, through the work of Vygotsky, direct and important 
implications for education. The abandonment of the pursuit of truth and the definition of 
learners as ‗producers of knowledge‘ who exhibit a multiplicity of ways of meaning-
making have made themselves felt within the classroom. They come about as a result of a 
general disenchantment with foundationalism, understood as the thesis that all knowledge 
rests ultimately on a foundation of noninferential knowledge. This understanding of 
foundation has no place in either Hegel‘s or Vygotsky‘s thought which, as I have argued 
elsewhere, can best be described as ‗antifoundational foundationalism‘.3 
 
 
It is in the context of his characterisation of Enlightenment rationality that Wertsch, while 
justifiably concerned with the inadequacies of schooling that fails to engage with the 
variety of ways that learners make meaning, points to the problems of privileging 
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decontextualised rationality as the form of ‗meaning making‘ in schooling. Wertsch is 
representative of a number of writers who are troubled by a school curriculum based on 
‗decontexualised rationality‘. He questions the value of this priority noting that; ‗the 
general tendency to privilege the voice of decontextualised rationality exists in spite of 
the fact that empirical evidence indicates that people who have mastered relevant abstract 
reasoning processes often do not use these processes, even when the situation clearly 
calls for them to do so‘. (Wertsch, 1992, p.122)  Wertsch views the ‗privileging‘ of 
particular mediational means (ways of solving problems), found in traditional schooling, 
as indicative of the extraordinary authority accorded to abstract rationality since the 
Middle Ages. He attempts to establish a direct link between his criticism of pedagogical 
practices that privilege abstract or decontextualised rationality and Toulmin‘s argument 
about the received view of Modernity. Toulmin refers to Descartes‘ teachings that the 
‗demands of rationality impose on philosophy a need to seek out abstract, general ideas 
and principles, by which particulars can be connected together‘ (Toulmin, 1992, p. 33) 
and Wertsch restates Toulmin‘s summary of the received view that ‘abstract axioms were 
in, concrete diversity was out’ (Wertsch, 1998, p. 67). Wertsch argues that: ‗the received 
view is routinely appropriated by people in our sociocultural setting and…results in 
viewing certain utterances and arguments as convincing despite the many critiques of this 
tendency‘ (Wertsch, 1998, p. 67). His concern with this privileging of abstract rationality 
over alternative ways of ‗meaning-making‘ is linked to his characterisation of 
Enlightenment rationality as an abstract universalism which involves a particular 
conception of scientific concepts. For Wertsch this characterisation leads onto his 
criticism of scientific concepts and their relation to the world. 
 
Wertsch develops his critique of Vygotsky by considering the arguments in chapter 
5 and 6 of Thinking and Speech
4. He is concerned with what he takes to be Vygotsky‘s 
emphasis on the relationship between semiotic expressions, such as words and sentences, 
and the world of objects. This, he see as complelling evidence for ‗a side of Vygotsky 
that was deeply committed to Enlightenment traditions of Abstract Rationality.‘ 
(Wertsch, 2000, p. 22)  He asserts, that at certain points in his work, Vygotsky 
approached meaning in terms of ostention, drawing on Charles Taylor to provide an 
explanation of what this entails. This is helpful in providing a clear characterisation of a 
common conception of meaning not just in philosophy but also one present in much 
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pedagogical practice and curriculum development. This conception has implications for 
pedagogy and educational practice though not in the way that Wertsch argues.  
 
 
In respect to ostention Wertsch draws on Taylor‘s distinction between designative 
and expressivist approaches to meaning to identify two trends - Rationality and 
Romanticism. Commenting on the view of meaning that he finds in Vygotsky‘s work he 
writes that: ‗This view of meaning is grounded on the assumption that language functions 
primarily to represent an independent reality‘ [italics added] and quotes Taylor to the 
effect that  ‗[W]e could explain a sign or word having meaning by pointing to what it 
designates, in a broad sense, that is, what it can be used to refer to in the world, and what 
it can be used to say about that thing. …we give the meaning of a sign or a word by 
pointing to the thing or relations that they can be used to talk about‘ (Taylor, cited in 
Wertsch, 2000 p. 26).  Wertsch argues that the relationship between word and object 
found in the designative approach is consistent with Vygotsky‘s account of meaning in 
scientific concepts, the argument being that Vygotsky had the same epistemological view 
of the relation of word to world. Central to Wertsch‘s argument that Vygotsky was an 
ambivalent rationalist is the claim that Vygotsky operates with ‗an assumption that 
language and meaning are basically concerned with referential relationships between 
signs and objects‘ (Wertsch, 2000, p. 20). It is the epistemological assumption implied by 
this claim with which I take issue. It is as well to point out that the issues at stake here 
reach beyond different conceptions of meaning as they have implications for classroom 
practice, curricula and pedagogy on the one side and scientific truth and knowledge on 
the other. These implications particularly to scientific truth and knowledge lead on to 
questions concerning epistemology. 
 
 
 
 
 
2. Vygotsky, abstract rationality, and the social foundations of mind 
 
             Like his contemporary Piaget, Vygotsky understood the importance of the 
inextricable connection between the development of human thought and epistemology. 
 8 
However in Vygotsky‘s enquiry into the nature of mind this connection is conceived in a 
different way from that of Piaget and involves a number of ideas whose educational 
significance is still being worked out. These ideas include the role of concepts, the nature 
of scientific concepts and the role of tools in the development of higher mental function.  
                   
Central to Vygotsky‘s work is the idea of the social formation of the mind, this can be 
most simply stated as the idea that while it has an individual dimension, thought cannot 
be properly understood as a solely individual activity. This social conception of mind is 
at odds with orthodox Anglo-American approaches where thought is ‗analyzed in terms 
of an individual‘s mental states‘.5 When this idea, of a social conception of mind, is acted 
upon, philosophical enquiry cannot help but enter terrains of concern, normally reserved 
for educationalists; that is to say the examination of the human mind can no longer be 
detached from the conditions within which it develops.  
 
The type of connection that his findings demonstrated between thought and 
language is not readily captured by the idea that a thought is articulated in speech. Rather 
in contrast to the conventional view that speech is the articulation of thought (and hence 
that thought can exist without articulation) Vygotsky claims that thinking and speech go 
together. It is not simply a matter of articulating what is already conceived, but 
articulation is part and parcel of the process of conceptualisation.  For instance one might 
say following this that the thought that cannot be put into words is the thought that is not 
resolved.  The significance for education of the idea that thought or concepts are only 
completed through their expression implies a rejection of the commonly practised mode 
of teaching known as ‗the transmission mode‘6.As Vygotsky stresses; ―direct instruction 
in concepts is impossible…The teacher who attempts to use the approach achieves 
nothing but a mindless learning of words…‘‘ (Vygotsky, 1987, p. 170). Once a concept 
has been learnt the development of its meaning for the learner has only just begun.  
 
         While Vygotsky‘s dialogic and developmental conception of concepts is 
widely appreciated, his  account of scientific concepts and the weight given to them, is 
viewed as problematic. Vygotsky distinguishes between different sorts of concepts; and 
in particular, between what he termed ‗everyday‘ or ‗spontaneous concepts‘ on the one 
hand and ‗scientific concepts on the other‘7. These two types of concepts acquire their 
meaning and are learnt though different practices: Everyday concepts are those that a 
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child learns spontaneously in daily life. Scientific concepts are those learnt through 
formal instruction. Scientific concepts take their meaning primarily from their systemic 
relation with one another rather than through any ad hoc relation to the world. The 
differences between these two concepts and the type of experience they depend upon are 
crucial for Vygotsky. As an illustration of the two concepts and the differences they 
entail, the following extract from Kozulin‘s Psychological Tools provides a vivid 
example: 
 
Here is a problem: ―A rope is tied around the Earth‘s equator. Then a 
ten-meter-long piece is added to it and the rope is pulled evenly so that 
everywhere the distance between the Earth‘s rope and the surface is the 
same? The question is: Would this distance be sufficient for a cat to 
sneak under the rope?‖ 
(Kozulin, 1998, preface) 
 
Kozulin recounts how he was given the problem by his son while driving and was 
unable to use a paper and pencil to utilise the symbolic tools of mathematics to calculate 
the answer. Instead he relied on imagining the additional length added in one place (a 
loop of about 5m high) and then being spread out to extend the full length of the rope, 
resulting in a minute gap too small for the cat to fit underneath. The use of scientific 
concepts of pi and radius, would have yielded the correct but counter intuitive answer of 
a 1.6m gap.
8
  
 
 It is important to be clear about the distinctive contribution and character of scientific 
concepts as well as their origin to avoid misunderstandings of his work as favouring 
abstract rationality in terms of its characterisation as a from of reason independent of any 
context. For scientific concepts are no less concrete than everyday concepts, they depend 
just as much on experience as everyday concepts, the difference being, instead of being 
direct their dependence is indirect though many enquiries over many generations. 
Scientific concepts bear the characteristics of abstract, formal thinking and as such are 
crucial for schooling.  
 
The extensive interest in the work of Vygotsky is in a large part due to the original 
implications of his work. While these implications range over such diverse fields as 
health care, educational technologies and schooling, the potential impact of the work is 
inextricably tied up with a fundamental understanding of the relation of human beings to 
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the world (Mind and World) and of what it is to be human i.e. what is distinctive about 
thinking beings. Our cognitive powers clearly distinguish us from animals and machines 
yet many accounts of our relation to the world fail to make the distinction or if they do 
make it fail to develop it sufficiently. Indeed as has been mentioned here the social nature 
of the human mind has generally been approached in education studies in terms of a 
multiplicity of forms of thought tied to context and mediational means rather than in 
terms of an examination of what is distinctively and universally human about its 
character. 
 
Criticisms of Vygotsky‘s work rely on an implicit epistemological framework that 
fails to recognise that his work lies in different territory from what is generally associated 
with ‗abstract rationality‘. This has implications not just for debates about knowledge but 
also about schooling policy. Hence the argument here for the importance of achieving a 
fuller grasp of the philosophical background to Vygotsky‘s work. 
 
       One reason for the neglect of this area by non-philosophers is the difficulty of 
grasping the relevant material. The philosophers to whom Vygotsky owes a special debt 
(Hegel and Spinoza) are notoriously difficult to understand; in the case of Hegel the 
difficulties are compounded by serious misrepresentation (Pinkard, 2000). It is far 
beyond the scope of this paper to deal with these difficulties even though a fuller 
appreciation of the conception of scientific concepts that Vygotsky was working with 
would involve a thorough excavation of the influence of both Hegel and Spinoza on his 
thought.
9
 
  
As has been made clear, then, this paper takes a radically different approach from 
that of Wertsch and other commentators, by adopting a positive position vis-à-vis the 
enlightenment tradition which Wertsch finds so problematic. In support of this position it 
draws attention to the work of the contemporary philosophers already mentioned whose 
reading of enlightenment thinkers has much in common with Vygotsky.  The influence of 
Hegel‘s Phenomenology on John McDowell10 and Robert Brandom has been crucial for 
rethinking problems that have come out of analytic philosophy such as the relation of 
language to the world and it is suggested here that it is also a fertile source, via the work 
of Vygotsky, for education. It is here that an internal development within philosophy 
concerning epistemology has significant implications for education. 
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It is worth noting in passing, that epistemology has received revived interest as new 
developments have opened up possibilities for a cross fertilisation between social theory, 
psychology and philosophy. In particular the reading of Hegel being worked through by 
contemporary philosophers steeped in the analytical tradition already mentioned, whose 
approach at first sight seems wholly at odds with Hegel, is proving especially interesting. 
The conception of Hegel as a metaphysician has been replaced by that of him as a 
philosopher who had addressed many of the problems of contemporary philosophy. For 
instance that of language may have followed a different course, for example Rorty, 
referring to Pippin‘s work on Hegel, has said; ‗Had we listened to Hegel, Wittgenstein's 
private language argument would have seemed a reiteration of the obvious‘. (Rorty, 
2005) It is appropriate now to turn our attention to the influence of Hegel not only in 
Vygotsky but also in Brandom, and to connections between their work.  
 
 
 
3. Hegel’s Enlightenment: from Vygotsky to Brandom  
 
Hegel, who was particularly important for Vygotsky believed that enlightenment 
thought had not achieved the liberatory goal of reason. To this end he developed, 
particularly in his Logic, a system of thought which established its own foundations as 
part of its process. This Hegelian system meets the objections levelled against 
Enlightenment thinking by many contemporary critiques.
11
 But as far as Vygotsky is 
concerned it does not appear to have been fully taken into consideration.  
 
 
The explanation of reference in Wertsch‘s reading of Vygotsky‘s discussion in 
Chapters 5 and 6 is at odds with Vygotsky‘s Hegelianism. However, the ‗ambivalence‘ 
that Wertsch detects in Vygotsky‘s work can be interpreted from the standpoint of 
Vygotsky‘s approach as the different paradigm from which he operates (Hegelian and 
inferentialist) which allows for both a universalising form of knowledge and the continual 
constitutive development of local meaning-making. Brandom has termed the paradigm in 
which this paper argues Wertsch is operating ‗representationalist‘ and counterposed it to 
an inferentialist approach to meaning. Unsurprisingly, given the influence of Hegel on the 
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work of Brandom, this is quite in line with Vygotsky‘s approach in Thinking and Speech. 
In line with this it could be argued that some of the concerns of those who take issue with 
abstract rationality are misplaced to the extent those concerns arise in the first place from 
representationalism.  
 
At numerous points in his work Vygotsky labours to take issue with a conception 
which sees thought as occupying a ‗representational‘ or simple referential relation to the 
world. The point he stresses when he speaks below of ‗a system of judgments‘ is that the 
idea of ‗general representations‘ is inadequate to express what a concept is in thinking: 
 
According to our hypothesis, we must seek the psychological 
equivalent of the concept not in general representations, not in absolute 
perceptions and orthoscopic diagrams, not even in concrete verbal 
images that replace the general representations – we must seek it in a 
system of judgements in which the concept is disclosed.  
(Vygotsky, 1998, p. 55) 
 
This makes clear just how far he was from embracing a simple representational view of 
the world.  
 
In educational practice some of the extreme polarisations implicit in constructivist 
positions (such as the idea that there is no way of ruling between any one set of ideas or 
another as ‗we come no closer to the truth‘ – Gergen, 1999, p. 239) can be viewed as an 
outcome of the problem of understanding what ‗objective world‘ entails within a 
foundationalist
12
 tradition of epistemology. Constructivism as well as Constructionism 
are often counterposed to realism (Parker, 1998, Gergen, 1999). Hence the realism 
evident in Vygotsky‘s use of the phrase ‗scientific concepts‘ is seen as evidence of a lack 
of appreciation on his part of multiple avenues of meaning-making in favour of didactic 
methods.  
 
The critique of ‗the Enlightenment project‘ as a version of abstract reason applied 
to the world in an authoritarian way has been extremely influential in education research, 
leading many commentators to question knowledge per se. When he criticises formal 
logic Vygotsky himself recognises the possibility of rationality controlling and regulating 
at the expense of richness and diversity: 
 
 13 
It is completely clear that if the process of generalizing is considered as 
a direct result of abstraction of traits, then we will inevitably come to 
the conclusion that thinking in concepts is removed from reality. … 
Others have said that concepts arise in the process of castrating reality. 
Concrete, diverse phenomena must lose their traits one after the other 
in order that a concept might be formed. Actually what arises is a dry 
and empty abstraction in which the diverse, full-blooded reality is 
impoverished by logical thought. This is the source of the celebrated 
words of Goethe: ‗Gray is every theory and eternally green is the 
golden tree of life‘.  
 
          (Vygotsky, 1998, p. 53)  
 
 
However, as this commentary on the generalisations of formal logic shows, Vygotsky‘s 
view of rationality is quite different from the one that construes ‗the development of 
meaning [as] a matter of increasing generalisation and abstraction‘ (Wertsch, 2000 p. 20). 
In contrast to the impoverished version of reason that is sometimes attributed to aspects 
of his work Vygotsky argues that: 
 
A real concept is an image of an objective thing in all its complexity. 
Only when we recognise the thing in all its connections and relations, 
only when this diversity is synthesised in a word, in an integral image 
through a multitude of determinations do we develop a concept. 
According to the teaching of dialectical logic, a concept includes not 
only the general, but also the individual and particular. 
      In contrast to contemplation, to direct knowledge of an object, a 
concept is filled with definitions of the object; it is the result of rational 
processing of our existence and it is mediated knowledge of the object. 
To think of some object with the help of a concept means to include the 
given object in a complex system of mediating connection and relations 
disclosed in determinations of the concept.  
(Vygotsky, 1998, p. 53) 
 
Vygotsky‘s emphasis on the systemic character of concepts is taken by Wertsch to be an 
indication of the type of decontextualised and abstract rationality which he views as so 
problematic for schooling in the current period. However, what Vygotsky refers to is not 
the abstract system he depicts but rather, like Brandom, an approach that prioritises 
inference over reference. For Vygotsky, the relation of a concept to an object is one that 
is necessarily part of a system of judgements which involve the ‗mediating connection 
and relations disclosed in the determinations of the concept‘ (Vygotsky, 1998, p. 53).  
This is the basis of an epistemology quite different from the one implicit in Wertsch‘s 
critique. Following Hegel, it conceives the relation of a thinking being to the world as 
necessarily social, since our responsiveness to the world which develops as part of our 
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second nature operates within what McDowell
13
 (drawing on Wilfred Sellars) has called 
‗the space of reasons‘ (i.e. our responses are necessarily normative).  
 
The prioritisation of inference over reference entails, in terms of pedagogy, that the 
grasping of a concept (knowing) requires committing to the inferences implicit in its use 
in a social practice of giving and asking for reasons. Effective teaching involves 
providing the opportunity for learners to operate with a concept in the space of reasons 
within which it falls and by which its meaning is constituted. Participation in such a space 
does not require an immediate and full grasp of the reasons constituting the concept but 
rather only the ability to inhabit the space in which reasons and the concept operate in the 
first place.
14
  
The idea that a sign, word or concept might be understood primarily as a relation of 
representation to the world is precisely what Hegel takes issue with in the 
Phenomenology. As Brandom reminds us, Hegel‘s achievement was to build on what 
Kant had already begun:  
 
The subtlety and sophistication of Kant's concept of representation is 
due in large part to the way in which it is integrated into his account of 
the inferential relations among judgments.  It remained for Hegel, 
however, to complete the inversion of the traditional order of semantic 
explanation by beginning with a concept of experience as inferential 
activity and discussing the making of judgments and the development 
of concepts entirely in terms of the role they play in inferential activity. 
 (Brandom, 1994, p. 92) 
 
Brandom formulates his Hegelianism as a prioritisation of inference over reference. 
Similarly Vygotsky‘s Hegelianism rejects the position that takes the meaning of a 
concept primarily in terms of its representation of an object. Instead, what has priority is 
the system of inferences in which the object is disclosed.  
 
For Brandom the distinguishing feature of a thinking being is its responsiveness to 
reasons rather than simply to causes. Responsiveness to causes is characteristic of a 
machine or a parrot capable of responding differentially to a stimulus, but not of thinking 
beings qua thinking beings. A mechanical alarm may be far more effective in perceiving 
the dangers of a fire and sounding the alert than any human being. But when a human 
being shouts ‗fire!‘ he or she is always doing more than simply making a warning noise. 
When a child of five (as opposed to a much younger child whose uttered sounds are only 
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just beginning to operate as language) shouts ‗fire!‘ he or she knows its implications. He 
or she appreciates the consequences of the exclamation ‗fire!‘ and what follows from 
such an utterance. Brandom uses this example to illustrate his claim that human beings 
act and communicate inferentially. His point is that what distinguishes the human form of 
knowing from the type of ‗knowing‘ we might ascribe to a machine is the Sellarsian point 
that knowing for a human being, consists not merely in expressing a response but in 
knowing what follows from it – knowing the implications, or what Brandom calls the 
‗giving and asking of reasons‘ (Brandom, 2000, p. 163). As he puts it ‗even non-
inferential reports must be inferentially articulated‘ and this point is crucial to any 
understanding of human intellect: 
 
One of the most important lessons we learn from Sellars's masterwork, 
‗Empiricism and Philosophy of Mind‘ (as from the ‗Sense Certainty‘ 
section of Hegel's Phenomenology), is the inferentialist one that even 
noninferential reports must be inferentially articulated. Without that 
requirement we cannot tell the difference between noninferential 
reporters and automatic machinery such as thermostats and photocells, 
which also have reliable dispositions to respond differentially to 
stimuli.  
(Brandom, 2000, p. 48) 
 
I have just mentioned an alarm perceiving a fire. This is already an anthropomorphism 
which Brandom takes care to avoid. He talks of machines ‗responding differentially to 
stimulus‘ by which he means they respond mechanically to a stimulus. The use of the 
phrase ‗responding differentially‘ in place of ‗perceiving‘ or ‗knowing‘ is of crucial 
importance for it introduces a distinction that is hidden by our anthropomorphic use of 
language. The stimulus in this case – the fire - is a cause of their response; in the case of 
the human being who sounds the alarm the fire is the reason for their response. The 
human perceives the fire as fire; that is to say that unlike a machine it has a concept of 
fire as part of a system of concepts. For Brandom making a report as a human being is 
not merely to ‗respond differentially‘ it is inferring rather than merely representing, since 
‗even non inferential reports must be inferentially articulated‘ (Brandom, 2000, p. 47). 
This emphasis on inference is drawn from Hegel‘s analysis of what Sense Certainty 
entails, and in keeping with Hegel, Brandom argues that ‗in order to master any concept, 
one must master many concepts‘ (Brandom, 2000, p. 49). For Brandom, the responses 
that humans make involve an understanding of significance that is only possible by 
already appreciating other concepts. Where this is not the case, i.e. in the response of a 
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parrot or machine, even though the response still may be the same, i.e. ‗fire‘, then the 
human is not behaving as human.  
 
The emphasis on inference that Brandom credits to Hegel is not without important 
implications for schooling. It provides a basis for a conception of knowledge and the 
process of acquiring it whereby the use and understanding of a word cannot be conceived 
simply in terms of the designative approach to meaning that Wertsch finds in aspects of 
Vygotsky‘s work.  On the contrary, following Brandom, and Hegel, in order to 
understand, it is necessary to ‗make explicit‘ the connections and determinations which 
constitute a concept. For Vygotsky, these connections and determinations are not due to 
‗abstract rationality‘ (even though they are objective) but to the cultural-historical activity 
of human beings in the world of which they are part. Brandom explains this in terms of 
social practices: 
 
I think one of the most important lessons we can learn from Kant 
concerns the normative character of concept use. Hegel, as I read him, 
transposed this insight into a pragmatist key, with his idea that 
normative statuses are always the product of social practices. I see 
Hegel, already in the Phenomenology of Spirit of 1807, wrestling with 
a core of issues that we only recovered access to recently, largely 
through the efforts of the later Wittgenstein. I have in mind issues 
concerning the possibility of understanding conceptual objectivity in 
the context of a social practice account of the norms implicit in concept 
use.   
(Brandom, 1999) 
 
 
Here is a view of meaning and objectivity radically different from the one contained in 
Wertsch‘s claim that Vygotsky was ambivalent about Enlightenment Rationality. There 
are negative consequences to Wertsch‘s critique of a view of knowledge found in 
pedagogic practice which prioritises reference and predicates a simple correspondence 
model of scientific concepts. From the viewpoint of common sense and in cases of poor 
teaching practice, words are understood solely to take their meaning from the things they 
represent, and it is taken as a given that it is through awareness of this connection that 
learning occurs. Knowing as opposed to awareness of association requires a different 
stance. However, in the absence of an appreciation that there is an alternative to this 
approach to meaning (one which incorporates designation but only as secondary to the 
inferences that are the historical genesis of its meaning) the attack on ‗abstract 
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rationality‘ can lead to a damaging relativism, where the weight given to discourse, 
speech types and the historical consitution of meaning making has led to an agnosticism 
for truth. The absence of any consideration of the inferential character of concepts in 
Piagetian pedagogy and the influence of this absence on constructivism, has fostered the 
idea that an individual  learner left to his/her own devices in a rich environment will 
‗create‘ knowledge. However the design of such an environment requires more careful 
attention to detail than is often realised. Indeed it is often the case that the idea that the 
learning environment requires design at all is ignored
15
. By contrast a Vygotskian 
approach doesn‘t depend simply on individuals being placed in the required environment 
where they discover meaning for themselves. The learning environment must be designed 
and cannot rely on the spontaneous response to an environment which is not constructed 
according to, or involves, some clearly worked out conceptual framework. For Vygotsky 
concepts depend for their meaning on the system of judgements (inferences) within 
which they are disclosed. Brandom‘s careful study of concept use argues that concepts by 
their nature are not isolated from one another;  
 
to have conceptual content is just for it [a concept] to play a role in the 
inferential game of making claims and giving and asking for reasons. To grasp 
or understand such a concept is to have practical mastery over the inferences it is 
involved in—to know, in the practical sense of being able to distinguish, what 
follows from the applicability of a concept, and what it follows from.                
(Brandom 1994, p. 48) 
 
To underline: for the Vygotskian approach, the connections are not arbitrary (nor the 
outcome of the individual learners ‗creativity‘) but inform the meaning of the concept in 
the first place (whether explicit or not).  It is through proper appreciation of the 
philosophy informing Vygotsky's work that we can reconsider the attack on reason made 
within the field of Vygotskian research and with it a more robust view of the question of 
knowledge in education. 
   
It is clear that although no simple conclusion can be drawn one point does emerge from 
the argument and that is the valuable criticism that Wertsch and others make of the 
limitations of mass education and its teaching practices do not require the wholesale 
rejection of the Enlightenment tradition. It is true that the very worse practices of 
authoritarian didacticism can be characterised as participating in an ‗abstract rationality‘ 
which appears to have a provenance in seventeenth and eighteenth century thought. But it 
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is also true that this same tradition provided a criticism of abstract rationality which is as 
thorough as to be found in contemporary thinking.  
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1
 It is only recently that a wide range of Vygotsky‘s work has been made available to the English reader and 
with the work, the extent of philosophical influence on him by Spinoza and Hegel. The two books by which 
he is most commonly known (Thought and Language and Mind in Society) are by their editors‘ admission 
not representative. 
2
 The expression ‗hierarchical form of reason‘ is used to capture the belief in progress towards a universal 
form of rationality of which different cultural groups exhibit characteristics which place them higher or 
lower on an evolutionary scale. 
3
  Derry (2000) ‗Foundationalism and anti-foundationalism: seeking enchantment in the rough ground‘ in 
V. Oittinen (ed) Evald Ilyenkov’s philosophy revisited, Kikimora Publications, Helsinki. 
4
 The first English language edition of an edited version of this work translated the title as Thought and 
Language and this is the name by which Vygotsky‘s work is commonly known. The English edition of the 
Collected Works Volume 1 (1987) used the more correct translation of Thinking and Speech. 
5
 ‗… the disinterest of mainstream philosophy of mind in matters of education results from an inherited 
Cartesianism, according to which … mental contents can and ought to be analyzed in terms of an 
individual‘s mental states.‘ (Westphal, 2000)  
6
 This is not to deny that learning can be supported in a number of ways including didactic approaches 
which involve practice and habituation. 
7
 In the original Russian of Vygotsky‘s text the term scientific here has a more general meaning and applies 
to academic concepts. 
8
 (C is circumference of the earth, r is radius of the earth; R is the new radius after 10 meters is added to the 
circumference) C=2π r; C+10 metres = 2π R; r + 10/2π = R; R – r = 1.6 meters (i.e. the additional gap). 
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9
 See Derry (2004) The Unity of Intellect and Will: Vygotsky and Spinoza in Educational Review, Volume 
56, Number 2  
10
 McDowell credits Brandom‘s writings and conversations with shaping his own thinking and singles out a 
seminar on Hegel‘s Phenomenology of Spirit that he attended in 1990 relating that ‗the effect is pervasive; 
so much so that I would like to conceive …[Mind and World] as a prolegomenon to a reading of the 
Phenomenology much as Brandom‘s forthcoming Making It Explicit: Reasoning, Representing, and 
Discursive Commitment is…a prolegomenon to his reading of that difficult text.‘ (McDowell, 1996, p. ix). 
11
 Brandom claims that Hegel was struggling with issues concerning conceptual objectivity that ‗analytic 
philosophy has had laboriously to rediscover in this century, due to the efforts of such thinkers as 
Wittgenstein, Sellars, Quine, and Kuhn.‘ (Brandom, 1999)  For a clear account of Hegel‘s work that opens 
the way to an understanding of these issues see Stephen Houlgate‘s Introduction to Hegel. 
12
 By using the shorthand ‗foundationalist tradition‘ here I mean to capture the tradition that Hegel criticises 
in the Phenomenology – both dualism and representationalism are elements in a foundational approach to 
knowledge. 
13
 David Bakhurst (1997) has brought to our attention the links between McDowell‘s work and the 
Vygotskian tradition through his work on the philosopher Ilyenkov.  
14
 Initiation into such a space opens the opportunity for the development of word meaning. 
15
 Design here entails far more than the formalities involved in the sort of lesson planning which details 
what resources and activities will be used at which point. 
